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Same-Sex Divorce
Tracy A. Thomas *
Same-sex marriage is now legal in seventeen states and sixteen countries. 1
With this change, a question increasingly being asked is how same-sex couples
can divorce. It is an easy answer for those who live in a marriage equality state;
the usual divorce procedures apply. The problem arises for those who live in or
move to a prohibition state that does not authorize same-sex marriage. As an
article in the New York Times recently explained, “[i]n a highly mobile society,
state bans on same-sex marriage have in many cases made untying the knot far
harder than tying it in the first place.” 2 Without the legal option to divorce,
same-sex couples cannot remarry, suffer psychological harm from forced
personal relationships and incur continued financial burdens from joint
obligations like debt, insurance, and federal taxes. 3

Copyright © 2014 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
*
Aileen McMurray Trusler Professor of Law, The University of Akron.
1. As of January 2014, the states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. The countries are Argentina,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, England/Wales, France, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.
2. See Erica Goode, Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage May Help Resolve Status of Divorce, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/us/ruling-might-also-ease-the-way-forsame-sex-divorces.html.
3. Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, Texas Hold ‘Em, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/09/texas_and_gay_marriage_will
_texas_refusal_to_grant_divorces_to_same_sex.single.html; Karen Hartman, Bound in a Gay Union
by a State Denying It, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/
nyregion/bound-in-a-gay-union-by-a-state-that-didnt-recognize-it.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
see
Mary P. Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Same-Sex Divorce in a DOMA State, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 214
(2012); Goode, supra note 2; Jesse Green, From “I Do” to “I’m Done”, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 24, 2013),
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The legal gap between marriage and divorce exists because divorce
jurisdiction requires the domicile of a party while marriage does not.
“Domicile” is the state where the party resides with the intent to remain.
Divorce jurisdiction usually requires residence for six months to one year prior
to filing. 4 A few marriage equality states—California, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Minnesota, and Vermont—now statutorily exempt same-sex
marriage from the residency requirements and allow non-residents married in
the state to return to divorce if their home state refuses to dissolve the
marriage. 5 One state, Georgia, expressly bans same-sex divorce for out-of-state
marriages. 6 In the rest of the marriage prohibition states, the only option seems
to be that one partner permanently relocate to a marriage equality state to
establish the domicile required to petition for divorce. 7
Courts confronted with the question of same-sex divorce have responded
in conflicting ways. Some courts have denied divorces, 8 while others have
granted them. 9 Looking closely at the reasoning of the cases suggests some

http://nymag.com/news/features/gay-divorce-2013-3.
4. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding state’s one-year residency requirement
for divorce as permissible, but not required under due process); In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d
869 (Iowa 1991) (recognizing a husband’s domicile as sufficient basis for divorce jurisdiction despite
wife’s residence and place of marriage in Japan). But see Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce
Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (proposing a
change in the basis of divorce jurisdiction from the corporate-like in rem domicile rule to the usual in
personam minimum contacts rule) .
5. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(f) (West 2010); D.C.
CODE § 16-902(b)(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07 (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 592(b)–(c) (West 2007); see also Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33, s. 7 (Can.); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-15-115 & 14-15-116 (West 2013) (allowing divorce through a civil union statute).
There may also be a question of proper personal jurisdiction over the non-residents necessary to
adjudicate the incidents of divorce such as financial and custodial issues where the respondent does not
consent to jurisdiction. See Armin U. Kuder & Marcia Kuntz, Legal Challenges of Divorce for SameSex Couples, in UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 27
(2013); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(f) (requiring consent to nonexclusive jurisdiction for
divorce proceedings as a condition of same-sex marriage); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592(b)–(c)
(allowing non-resident same-sex divorce only if no children were born or adopted during the marriage
and the parties agree to financial stipulations).
6. GA. CONST., art. I, § 4; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (West 2003).
7. See generally Ellen Shapiro, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: The Difficulties of Obtaining A SameSex Divorce, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 208 (2013); Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of
Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Alan Johnson, Judge Refuses Lesbians a Divorce, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug.
24, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/08/24/judge-refuses-to-give-lesbians-adivorce.html (denying divorce in Thompson v. Roller); In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR014654 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2009) (denying divorce for Canadian same-sex marriage); see also
O’Darling v. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137 (Okla. 2008) (invalidating divorce where same-sex nature was
not disclosed to and addressed by the court).
9.
See, e.g., Ryan Dunn, Hancock County First: A Same-Sex Divorce, COURIER (Aug. 16,
2013), http://www.thecourier.com/Issues/2013/Aug/16/ar_news_081613_story3.asp (granting divorce
in Mason v. Essinger); Alan Johnson, Married in New York, Local Gay Couple Gets Divorced in
Columbus, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/
2012/03/23/ohio-gay-couple-receive-divorce.html (granting divorce in Baize v. Wissman); Johnson,
supra note 8 (granting divorce in Dzhembaz v. Volkov).
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legal options for courts in marriage prohibition states facing divorce petitions
from same-sex couples. These options include limited recognition of the
external marriage under conflicts of laws principles; declaring unconstitutional
the laws that deny recognition to legal same-sex marriages or that deny samesex couples access to the courts; or voiding the marriage by annulment.
I.
LIMITED RECOGNITION OF EXTERNAL MARRIAGE
One legal option is for courts to consider limited recognition of a samesex marriage solely for purposes of divorce. 10 This incidental recognition
promotes the policies behind divorce laws—disentanglement of affairs,
personal freedom, ability to remarry, and access to the courts—but does not
necessarily validate ongoing same-sex marriages. 11 It thus arguably furthers the
public policy of the states prohibiting same-sex marriage by terminating those
unauthorized partnerships.
A. Conflicts of Law
Under the usual conflicts-of-law rule, a state will recognize out-of-state
marriages that were valid in the state where they were performed. 12 In the vast
majority of cases, courts apply the rule of lex loci celebrationis, looking to the
law of the location where the marriage was celebrated or contracted to
determine its validity. 13 Thus, states typically recognize easily lawful out-ofstate marriages even when they differ from the state’s own laws governing, for
example, marital age, degrees of kinship, or common-law marriages. 14 The lex
loci rule arises from comity by which “courts will give effect to laws and
judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation
but out of deference and respect.” 15 Accordingly, the Supreme Courts of
Wyoming and Maryland and courts in New York have relied on comity to
recognize lawful out-of-state same-sex marriages and grant divorces. 16
10.
See generally Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis when
Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wy. 2011) (“[A]ccepting that a
valid marriage exists plays no role except as a condition precedent to granting a divorce. After the
condition precedent is met, the laws regarding divorce apply. Laws regarding marriage play no role.”).
12. See, e.g., Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 975–76 (Md. 2012); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853
N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (Sup. Ct. 2008); see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997).
13. See Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156; Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public
Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINN. L. REV. 61 (1996). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971) (exception for marriage evasion).
14. See Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013);
Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504; Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1958) (recognizing
lawful Massachusetts marriage between first cousins even though such kinship marriages were not
authorized in Ohio).
15. Port, 44 A.3d at 975 (internal quotations omitted).
16. See Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156; Port, 44 A.3d at 982; Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504;
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Courts might also use more generalized, commercial choice-of-law
principles to apply the law of the state where the couple formed the marital
contract. Under this approach, the state forum would function merely as a
conduit for the other state’s law of marriage validity and divorce remedies of
marital property, support, and custody. 17
Article IV of the Constitution of the United States similarly supports the
application of conflicts of law principles, providing that states should give full
faith and credit to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” of the
sister states. 18 The clause embodies the general “wise policy” of respect for the
official acts of another state, 19 and facially seems to require that states
recognize the lawful marriages of other states. Scholars, however, disagree as
to whether the clause mandates interstate recognition of same-sex marriage,
questioning whether marriage is an “act” or “record” and whether there is any
exception to the recognition command. 20
More significantly, the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)—
enacted pursuant to the authority of the Full Faith and Credit Clause—provides
an exemption that “[n]o State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceedings of any other State . . . respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage.” 21
Relying on this language, one Pennsylvania court concluded that DOMA
eliminated any requirement to recognize a Massachusetts same-sex marriage
for purposes of divorce. 22 Yet, the federal statute, by its express exception,
implies that the constitution otherwise requires recognition of external samesex marriages.
B. Public Policy Exceptions
While broad principles of common law and federalism support
recognition of same-sex marriages, both incorporate a public policy exception
to that recognition. Under this exception, states will not recognize the validity
of an out-of-state marriage where it would violate their own public policy. 23
Courts have traditionally used the public policy exception when legal marriages

C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d. 884, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2008). But see Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956,
964 (R.I. 2007) (denying divorce as state did not authorize same-sex marriage), superseded by statute,
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2013).
17. See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 3, at 218; Parker v. Waronker, 918 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824–
25 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
19. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425–26 (1979).
20. Compare Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2155 (2005) with Kramer, supra note 12, at
1986–87.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
22. Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 563 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010); see also Wilson v. Ake,
354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–04 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
23. Kramer, supra note 12, at 1975–76.
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implicate crimes like polygamy or incest. 24 But importantly, “[t]he policy
exception is necessarily narrow, lest it swallow the rule.” 25
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reconciled its own public policy against
establishing same-sex marriage to grant a divorce of a lawful Canadian
marriage. In Christiansen v. Christiansen the court held that recognizing a
foreign same-sex marriage for the “limited purpose of entertaining a divorce
proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in Wyoming against allowing the
creation of same-sex marriages.” 26 The Wyoming court emphasized that “[a]
divorce proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing
relationship,” but merely establishes the condition precedent to granting a
divorce. 27 The court emphasized that the divorce petition did not seek to give
effect to the marriage or establish a right to live in the state as a married couple:
“They are not seeking to enforce any right incident to the status of being
married. In fact, it is quite the opposite.” 28
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Port v. Cowan granted a
divorce to a couple married lawfully out of state, distinguishing its thenexisting policy against same-sex marriage. 29 The court held that limited
recognition was not repugnant to state policy because the state did not
criminalize same-sex marriage; rather, the state’s laws recognized and
protected against discrimination based on sexual orientation. 30
Unlike Wyoming and Maryland, most prohibitory states have express
language against recognizing out-of-state marriages. A few “super-DOMA”
states like Texas and Ohio have additional language against giving effect or any
legal benefit to same-sex marriages. 31 Courts in Texas and Pennsylvania
emphasized these restrictive prohibitions in refusing to grant same-sex
divorces. 32 For example, in In re Marriage of J.B., a Texas Court of Appeals
found divorce to be a claim or “demand of a right” to legal benefits like
community property rights that are “asserted as a result of a marriage.” 33 Thus,
the court held that divorce would improperly give effect to the couple’s
marriage by presuming a valid marriage capable of divorce and by granting
“paradigmatic legal benefit[s]” like marital property, 34 violating state law that

24. Id. at 1970.
25. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wy. 2011).
26. Id. at 156.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 44 A.3d 970, 975 (Md. 2012).
30. Id. at 979–80.
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c)(2) (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.01(C)(3) (2011). See Robert E. Rains, A Minimalist Approach to Same-Sex Divorce:
Respecting States that Permit Same-Sex Divorce and States that Refuse to Recognize Them, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 393, 420 (2012).
32. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. App. 2010), review granted,
Aug. 23, 2013; Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 562–63 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010).
33. 326 S.W.2d at 665.
34. Id. at 666.
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prohibited “giving any effect whatsoever” to same-sex marriage. On pending
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, plaintiffs argue that divorce is not a marital
benefit, but rather a residential benefit, extending the right of access to the
courts to those who reside in the state. 35
Following this line of reasoning, states with “super-DOMA” laws might
read narrowly the prohibition against marital legal benefits to restrict only the
beneficial establishment of same-sex partnerships, thus permitting divorce. For
example, Ohio treats out-of-state same-sex marriages “in all respects as having
no legal force or effect” and prohibits granting “specific statutory benefits of a
legal marriage” to these partnerships. 36 Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court held in
State v. Carswell that the voter intent behind this constitutional provision
enacted by ballot initiative was to prevent the legislative or judicial creation of
legal statuses that approximate marriage, like civil unions or domestic
partnerships. 37 Therefore, the court held, the constitutional provision did not
preclude same-sex partners from accessing statutory benefits of marriage like
the domestic violence protection. 38 Similarly, the divorce statute, like the
domestic violence statute, may not be precluded by the constitutional provision
that aims to prevent the establishment of marriage-like status for same-sex
couples. 39
II.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DENIALS
A state’s assertion of the public policy exception to deny recognition of
same-sex marriage for divorce must still comport with the Constitution. 40 The
exception cannot be used to accomplish unconstitutional objectives, as the
Supreme Court held in the inter-racial marriage case of Loving v. Virginia. 41
Legal scholars have concluded that denying same-sex divorce violates equal
protection and due process because there is “no legitimate reason to keep
acrimonious couples married,” especially in a time where all fifty states permit
no fault divorce. 42 The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Windsor bolsters this conclusion in striking down the provision of DOMA
denying recognition to valid state same-sex marriages.

35. See Lithwick & West, supra note 3. The companion case in the Texas appeal did uphold
the same-sex divorce granted by the trial court, finding that the state had no standing to intervene in the
private matter. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. 2011), review granted, Aug. 23, 2013.
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(2)–(3) (West 2011).
37. 871 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ohio 2007).
38. Id. at 554.
39. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 16–
26 (2012).
40. Kramer, supra note 12, at 1971.
41. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
42.
E.g., Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 39, at 25; Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 3, at 215;
Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 108-110.
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A Texas trial court in In re Marriage of J.B. agreed that a denial of samesex divorce violated equal protection, but was reversed on appeal. 43 The Texas
Court of Appeals held that the legitimate state interest in “promoting the raising
of children in the optimal familial setting” justified under rational basis the
classification granting the right to divorce only to opposite-sex couples and not
to same-sex couples. 44 The court held that the persons classified were
distinguished by the relevant characteristic of their “natural ability to procreate”
based on the state’s legitimate interest in “fostering relationships that will serve
children best.” 45 On pending appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the
petitioners challenge that “the court of appeals never connects the dots” to
show a rational relation, questioning how denying same-sex couples access to
divorce promotes the optimization of marriage, procreation, and the raising of
children in opposite-sex households. 46
The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor concludes more emphatically
that non-recognition of valid same-sex marriages is unconstitutional, finding
only animus against same-sex couples behind the pretext of optimal family
life. 47 The majority framed the problem with DOMA as discrimination in the
government’s recognition of all lawful state marriages, except same-sex
marriages. 48 The government, the Court held, expressly targeted a class of
marriages some states had intended to protect. The Court concluded that no
rational state interest justified this denial, as the legislative intent simply
disapproved of homosexuals, stigmatized gay marriages, and created a
preference for heterosexual marriages. 49
Relying on Windsor, an Ohio federal court in Obergefell v. Kasich
recognized the validity of a lawful out-of-state same-sex marriage for purposes
of identification on a death certificate. 50 The court framed the issue as Ohio’s
usual practice of recognizing the validity of lawful out-of-state marriages under
lex loci versus its differing treatment of denial of same-sex marriages. 51 It
concluded that “this [wa]s not a complicated case” and Windsor supported the
conclusion that the targeting of same-sex partners of lawful marriages lacked
basis in any rational state interest, but rather arose from animus and disapproval
of homosexuality in violation of equal protection. 52 The court, in a related
43. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010).
44. Id. at 677.
45. Id. at 674; see Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 575–76 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010).
46. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 26, In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., No. 11-0024 (Tex.
Sept. 6, 2011), 2011 WL 8584393, at *26.
47. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see Goode, supra note 2.
48. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
49. Id. at 2695–96; see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
50. No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (granting temporary
restraining order). The plaintiff, John Arthur, died three months later. Tim Swift, Gay Ohio Man Who
Sparked a Legal Case Dies, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/10/23/gay-ohio-marriage-case-death_n_4147659.html
51. Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262 at *5.
52. Id. at *1.
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decision on the merits, articulated the constitutional implications of the usual
deference to out-of-state marriages, explaining that “once you get married
lawfully in one state, another state cannot summarily take your marriage away,
because the right to remain married is properly recognized as a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.” 53
The differential treatment of same-sex couples with respect to divorce
might also be framed as an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. 54
Individuals cannot divorce themselves through private agreement, and thus
require access to the courts. This state monopoly over divorce led the U.S.
Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut to find that a categorical denial of
access to the courts for one group of people violated due process. 55 In striking
down a categorical denial of divorce for indigent plaintiffs, the Court
emphasized the special nature of divorce as “a right of substantial magnitude”
that embodied access to the courts, the ability to escape constraints and legal
obligations, and the denial of the fundamental right to remarry. 56 By
distinguishing divorce from marriage, petitioners seeking same-sex divorce can
draw on the right of access to the courts and Windsor 57 to conclude that no
basis other than animus exists for denying divorce when no-fault divorce is
otherwise available in all states. 58
III.
VOIDING THE MARRIAGE
Parties to a same-sex marriage may alternatively seek to void or annul the
marriage. Courts in marriage prohibition states like Arizona, Texas, and
Pennsylvania have endorsed this option as a viable way to harmonize the
parties’ desire for divorce with state prohibitions on recognizing same-sex
marriage. 59

53.
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013Wl 6726688, at*1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23,
2013).
54.
Meg Penrose, Unbreakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the Fundamental Right to
Divorce, 58 VILL. L. REV. 169, 203 (2013); Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 39, at 33-36; Oppenheimer,
supra note 7, at 110; L. Lynn Hogue, The Constitutional Obligation to Adjudicate Petitions for SameSex Divorce and the Dissolution of Civil Unions and Analogous Same-Sex Relationships:
Prolegomenon to a Brief, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 229, 229–30 (2010).
55.
401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); see Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 39, at 33–36; Byrn &
Holcomb, supra note 3, at 215.
56. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380–81 & n.8.
57. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
58. Hogue, supra note 54, at 229.
59. E.g., Atwood v. Riviotta, No. 1CA-CV 12-0280, 2013 WL 2150021, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App.
May 16, 2013); Surnamer v. Ellstrom, No. 1CA-CV 11-0504, 2012 WL 2864412, at *1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. July 12, 2012); In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 667, 678–79 (Tex. App. 2010);
Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 576 (Com. Pl. Ct. 2010).
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In marriage prohibition states, laws and constitutional provisions deem
same-sex marriages void ab initio or invalid from their inception. 60 Voidance
by its nature does not recognize the validity of the marriage, but instead is
“based on the premise that the marriage is void” from the start. 61 This
theoretical distinction allows the courts to reconcile their state DOMAs because
voidance does not “recognize or effectuate a marriage” yet facilitates the samesex parties’ primary objectives of disentangling their personal and economic
affairs. 62
Annulment is the usual process for obtaining a judicial declaration voiding
a marriage. 63 However, annulment actions suffer from some potential
limitations. First, availability of annulment can be limited by short statute of
limitations periods after the celebration of the marriage or discovery of the
defect. 64 Second, annulment actions may not offer the usual range of marital
remedies like property division and spousal support that same-sex couples may
seek. 65 Some states have equitable savings clauses that extend such remedies in
annulment by analogy. 66 Alternatively, a court might resolve financial issues
using contract principles to enforce an express separation agreement or use
equitable principles of implied contract or unjust enrichment. 67
Third, a declaration of voidness might not be respected in marriage
equality states as terminating the marriage. 68 A Virginia court considering the
analogous issue of dissolving a civil union in a non-recognition state thought its
decision would not be binding in the originating state. 69 Yet, the Texas court in
In re Marriage of J.B. dismissed this extraterritorial concern, stating simply that
a declaration of voidness should be effective in other jurisdictions. 70 As
previously discussed, judicial decrees generally receive the highest degree of
interstate recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but only if
DOMA does not provide an exception. 71 Thus, uncertainty surrounds the
60. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(b) (West 2013) (“void in this state”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(1) (West 2011) (“void ab initio and shall not be recognized by this state”).
61. Atwood, 2013 WL 2150021, at *1; see also Surnamer, 2012 WL 2864412, at *2.
62. In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 667; see Hartman, supra note 3.
63. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.31 & 3105.32; HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 136–38 (2d. ed. 1988).
64. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.32 (two-year limitation for minors and fraud).
65. E.g., Liming v. Liming, 691 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); In re Marriage of
J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 679.
66. See Liming, 691 N.E.2d at 301; Atwood, 2013 WL 2150021, at *1; Surnamer, 2012 WL
2864412, at*2; In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 667; CLARK, supra note 63, at 138–40; see also
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES FOR THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.03, 6.05 (2002).
67.
E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976); Gonzales v. Green, 831
N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (Sup. Ct. 2006); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(3)(b) (dictating that the
state’s DOMA will not “[a]ffect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid under the
laws of th[e] state”).
68. See Rains, supra note 31, at 414.
69. Austin v. Austin, 75 Va. Cir. 240, 243 (2008).
70. In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 667.
71. See supra Part I.B.
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finality and effect of an annulment decree in a marriage equality state, and
states may even subject a party to liability for polygamy after remarriage,
should the state not recognize the annulment. 72
Finally, petitioners have also resisted the option of voiding the marriage as
a second-class alternative. They argue that voidance symbolically stigmatizes
their prior marriage by placing them in the “odious company” of unions
traditionally deemed illegitimate and criminal, like incestuous and polygamous
marriages, even though the Supreme Court has explicitly held the
criminalization of homosexual behavior to be unconstitutional. 73
CONCLUSION
Courts thus have several possible avenues for addressing petitions for
same-sex divorce in the absence of state authorization of same-sex marriage.
They might apply the law of the state of marriage celebration to acknowledge
the validity of that out-of-state marriage for the limited purpose of granting the
divorce. Principles of comity, lex loci, or full faith and credit support this
general approach with the secondary determination that the public policy
exception against establishing same-sex marriage is not implicated by the
limited recognition for termination. Courts relying on public policy against
same-sex marriage to prohibit the divorce must go further to evaluate the
constitutionality of that policy under equal protection and due process both for
discrimination in light of Windsor and for denial of access to the courts.
Alternatively, courts might process the case as an annulment to declare the
marriage void. Property, support, and custody issues would then be resolved by
designated statute where available, analogous equitable principles, or principles
of contract law. Given these available legal options, courts can no longer
simply dismiss the same-sex divorce action outright, but instead, must give full
legal consideration to the issue.

72. See Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17, 21–22 (Mass. 2012).
73. See In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 679–80 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578–79 (2003)).

